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1 5 
REPLY BRIEF uK APPELLANT 
Pursuant t< p> i. 2<\ ( - • nt : : - : d iniLv; f Appellate 
Procedure, Aprfd ] 'rv i , e s p ^ c r f u l ''* -;br."i ' • ' • / Bi :i e f :i i i 
c o * - • .•;•_•: :.• v . a i L e n j n n s u ; , ^ p p ^ i i - - ^ , R a n d / I iu iLo. 
h i s b r i e f , B u r t o n d e n a n d s a r i d i n q in h i s f a v o r b e c a u s e t h e t r i a l 
cour* -• ' ' ^ r n r . r f i n d i n -^ ' ' b-i -^. 
A. :. . _JU ; . . . n ; . ^ , : ; a c t w e n : n i p r e p a i c a Bui t o n s r e q u e s t 
i n a p p t o p r i d t e . in \}>.>i f i r s t p l a c e , t h e r e i s an a d e q u a t e r e c o r d -jl 
t h e ; r o c o ^ d h . •. q . 
SecL . . . ; j } , • ..'„ ] ; o p u i icmecly i.> r emand i o j p r e p a r a t i o n of l i r i d i n g s 
of f a c t and con : \ u s i o n s ol l a w . 
Ad d i t i o n a 11 y , B i 11 : t: o i l m :i s i n t e r p r e t s t: 1 I e e x :i s t :i i ig b o dy o f ] a w b;;,, ; 
cone I ud 11 Ig 11 Ia t t: 1 Ie a 11 e ge d "sea r c h" o f B u r t on ' s ve h i c 1 e required 
warrant 'his ooncvusion has no -justification in rhe cases cit^d 
piobable cause •*onduct_ the "search." The tria ••Jdqt-
specificaily held that the officer detected the odor of alcohol 
before he inserted his head in the vehicle window. In addition, 
the videotape as well as the officer's testimony shows that Burton 
voluntarily admitted that he was drunk. Therefore, the officer had 
probable cause that Burton had committed an offense, which 
justified further investigation that would quickly dispel or 
confirm the suspicion that had developed. The facts of the case 
indicate that the officer's actions were justifiable and 
reasonable. 
Contrary to Burton's argument, the officer had a reasonable 
articulable suspicion that Burton was drunk independent of any 
alleged "search" of the vehicle. Again, the trial judge 
specifically held that the officer detected the odor of alcohol 
before he inserted his head into the vehicle window. The trial 
judge also ruled that this gave the officer a reasonable 
articulable suspicion that Burton was drunk, prior to allegedly 
"searching" the vehicle. Therefore, even if the subsequent "search" 
was improper, the officer could have asked Burton to step from the 
car and perform field sobriety tests. In addition, the videotape 
of the stop shows that Burton voluntarily admitted he was drunk. 
This alone justified the field sobriety tests. 
In short, the evidence does not support the judge's conclusion 
to suppress the field sobriety tests. The police officer detected 
the odor of alcohol before he inserted his head into the vehicle. 
Second, Burton voluntarily admitted he was drunk. The officer had 
a reasonable articulable suspicion that Burton had violated the 
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^eff 7 - . .• •• • ,*-,:: • ; i : c p r was 
j u s t x i i e n :ondu M i n g t h e f i e l d s o b r i e t y t e s t s . F o r t h e s e 
r e a s o n s , m d (- r 1 ^ r e a s o n s : ; t \ i ! O'l r r . - l ! , : ' > 
< iec:::i i i> 1 c o u r *.,. . a *~ - , : a ^ . i , cind Lht; c a s e 
r e m a n d e d f o r p r o s e c u t i o n . 
ARGUMENT 
I. DISMISSAL IS INAPPROPRIATE BECAUSE THERE IS AN 
ADEQUATE RECORD OF THE PROCEEDINGS, AND, IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE, THE CASE COULD BE REMANDED SO THAT 
FINDINGS OF FACT COIJI ,D BE PREPARED. 
Because tii-re is an adequate record oi the proceedings, and 
also because findinqs of fact can bo easily obtained, ,J.n > *< >u ' s 
inland for ;• • , . ••• r M : : \ r 
,: ' .. : .r •-.., * ; .-.ppCjJaLu L-iocedure s t a t e s : ii the app e l l a n t 
i n t e n d s to u: cu- appeal that ., i indi nq <~u~ c o n c l u s i o n is 
1 i n s i i p p o r t e d b y o i :i s c ::»i I 1 1 : a i ) t: :: • 11 i e e v :i d e i I c e , t: I: i e a p p e 1 ] a i 11: s 1: i a ] ] 
Inclu d e :i i i t:l le record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such 
finding or conclusi on." I JTAH R. APP, P. '1 1 (e) (2) . A transcript of 
1:1 i e 1 I e a r :i i i g 1 I a s b e e i I p r e p a r e d a i l d s u b i i: i i 11: e d t: • : t: 1 i e C o i I i: t f o r 
review. In addition, the videotape of the stop, which was 
introduced as evidence at: the hearing, i s a ] so ava i lable . Thus , 
a ] ] e ^  ? j d e n c e r e ] e v a i 11 t: c t: i I B t: :i : :i a 1 c : I 11 : t: '"' s :: • :: • i i c 11 I s :i c i i I s a v a 11 a b 1 e 
for the Court. 
S i n c e a l l e v i d e n c e i s a v a i l a b l e IOT r e v i e w , i1:-- r e c o r d ~ s n o t 
i n c o , ' , : i - i - * >iii uiii^i :. : •;. ,. T . .c :r.;.: ..curt 
used to i eacl i its decision. "Rule 11 directs counsel to provide 
this court with all evidence relevant to the issues raised on 
appeal." Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1002 (Utah App. 1989) . 
The transcript of the proceedings and the videotape constitute all 
of the evidence relevant to the issue raised in this appeal. Even 
if findings of fact and conclusions of law were formally prepared 
and entered, this Court would still review the transcript and 
videotape. 
Burton's demand for a ruling in his favor violates the 
established case law in Utah. Failure to prepare an adequate 
record of findings is not grounds for winning an appeal. "It is 
well settled that the trial court should make findings on all 
material issues tried by the parties, and a failure to do so is 
generally considered a reversible error and requires a remand." 
Kinkella v. Baugh. 660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983) ,l In other words, 
if a trial court fails to prepare findings of fact or conclusions 
of law, the appeal should be remanded back so the court could 
prepare adequate findings. 
Burton cites State v. Genovesi to support his demand for a 
ruling in his favor. However, the trial court's record in Genovesi 
consisted of three brief statements and an order. There was no 
other record of the court's findings. State v. Genovesi, 871 P.2d 
1
 See also Parks v. Zions First Nat' 1 Bank, 673 P. 2d 590, 601 
(Utah 1983); Anderson v. Utah County Bd. of Comm'rs., 589 P.2d 
1214, 1216 (Utah 1979) . It should also be noted that in Kinkella, 
the court concluded that the record was adequate, even though the 
trial court had not prepared specific findings. Kinkella, 660 P.2d 
at 236. 
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547, 550 (Utah App. 1994) . The Court of Appeals did not rule on 
the case, but remanded the case for rehearing so that the trial 
court could enter more detailed findings of fact. Id. This 
decision was consistent with the established case law, and proper 
under the circumstances. 
Burton claims that remand would be "difficult and unfair," 
because the trial judge, Carlos Esqueda, is no longer on the bench. 
(Brief of Appellee, West Valley City v. Randy Burton, at 10 n.5 
(hereafter "Burton's Brief")). Burton, however, fails to explain 
the difficulty or unfairness. The transcript of the hearing and 
the videotape provide all of the evidence of the hearing, so any 
judge could ascertain findings of fact from the record. 
Furthermore, Mr. Esqueda still practices law in Salt Lake City, and 
so is certainly available to prepare findings if so ordered by this 
Court. In short, there is no difficulty or unfairness, because 
there is an adequate record of the proceedings and the evidence 
available. 
To conclude, Burton's demand for a ruling in his favor because 
there were no findings prepared is inappropriate and unsupported. 
In the first place, there is an adequate record available. A 
transcript of the hearing has been prepared, and the videotape of 
Burton's arrest, introduced as evidence, is available. Thus, all 
evidence is available for review. Second, the proper remedy is 
remand so the trial court could prepare findings of fact. Since 
the record is sufficient, any judge could prepare findings, or 
5 
arrangements could be made with Carlos Esqueda to prepare 
appropriate findings. 
Although contending that the record is sufficient as it is now 
constituted, Appellant agrees that findings of fact and conclusions 
of law would be beneficial in this case. Therefore, Appellant has 
no objection to remand, provided the remand is limited only to 
preparation of findings of fact and conclusions of law based upon 
the transcript of the hearing and the videotape of Burton's arrest, 
and not a retrial of the facts. 
II. THE OFFICER DID NOT EXCEED THE SCOPE OF HIS 
INVESTIGATION, BECAUSE HE HAD A REASONABLE 
ARTICULABLE SUSPICION THAT BURTON WAS DRUNK, AND 
BECAUSE THE OFFICER DILIGENTLY PURSUED MEANS TO 
QUICKLY CONFIRM THE EXTENT OF BURTON'S 
INTOXICATION. 
A. The Officer did not Exceed the Legitimate Scope of the 
Investigation. 
The officer did not exceed the scope of his investigation, 
because he had a reasonable articulable suspicion that Burton was 
drunk. The trial judge specifically ruled that the officer had a 
reasonable articulable suspicion that Burton was intoxicated, based 
on the odor of alcohol from outside of the vehicle. (Transcript of 
Hearing on Defendant's Motion to Suppress, West Valley City v. 
Randy Burton at 32-33 {hereafter "Transcript")). Thus, further 
investigation, the trial judge concluded, was justified. "I've 
already ruled that I don't think the officer went beyond the scope 
of the detention, because he initially — and it's obvious on the 
tape, he initially smells the odor of alcohol . . . So under case 
6 
law, under Lopez, this is a legitimate stop and it does not go 
beyond the scope . . . ." (Id. at 32). The reasonable articulable 
suspicion also justified field sobriety tests, regardless of any 
alleged "search" of Burton's vehicle. 
Burton argues that the officer did not have a reasonable 
articulable suspicion, and thus the officer exceeded the scope of 
the original stop. This however, contradicts the facts and the 
judge's specific ruling. The judge found that the officer detected 
the odor of alcohol prior to any alleged "search" of the vehicle. 
(Id. at 32-34). Furthermore, the evidence in the videotape shows 
that Burton voluntarily admitted he was drunk. (Id. at 15, 
Videotape). Thus, the officer could articulate specific facts 
connecting Burton to criminal activity.2 Since the officer had a 
reasonable articulable suspicion that Burton was drunk, the scope 
of his investigation expanded so that the officer could confirm the 
extent of Burton's intoxication.3 
Burton appears obsessed with the fact that the officer 
"nodded" to the passenger in the police car, arguing that the nod 
indicates that the officer had no cause to investigate further. 
The judge dismissed this argument as meaningless. "There's nothing 
wrong with a hunch if he can back it up ..." (Transcript at 32) ; 
see also Whren v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (1996) (holding 
that a legitimate traffic stop does not become illegitimate even 
though it was motivated by an officer's "hunch" that a more serious 
crime was being committed.) Even if the officer had a "hunch" prior 
to approaching Burton, there is ample evidence supporting the 
officer's reasonable articulable suspicion that Burton was drunk. 
(Transcript at 32-34). 
3
 Burton's Counsel argues that the Counsel for Appellant 
offers no support for the judge's ruling that the officer had a 
reasonable articulable suspicion that Burton was drunk. (Burton's 
7 
Burton reargues the testimony given by the officer to support 
his version of the facts. This is in error, as this Court will not 
disturb the factual findings of the trial court unless they are 
clearly erroneous. See State v. Naisbitt, 827 P.2d 969, 971 (Utah 
App. 1992) . The trial judge found, as been repeatedly stated, that 
the officer detected the odor of alcohol prior to any alleged 
search. (Transcript at 33). Furthermore, the testimony supports 
the record of the videotape that Burton voluntarily admitted he was 
drunk. (Id. at 15). Thus, the officer could articulate specific 
facts that Burton was intoxicated, and therefore expand his 
investigation. Burton may dislike the judge's findings, but he 
cannot argue that the officer exceeded the legitimate scope of the 
investigation. 
B. The "Search" of the Vehicle was Proper, Because the Officer 
Pursued a Means of Investigation to Quickly Confirm the Extent 
of Burton's Intoxication. 
The officer's investigation was reasonable because it quickly 
confirmed that Burton had been drinking heavily, and was a threat 
to other drivers. As was explained in Appellant's Brief, " [i]f 
reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity does arise, 
the scope of the [traffic] stop is still limited. The officers 
must 'diligently [pursue] a means of investigation that [is] likely 
to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly . . . .'" State v. 
Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994); see also Appellant's Brief, 
Brief at 17 n. 11) . However, even though Burton dislikes the 
finding, the judge specifically held that the officer detected the 
odor of alcohol prior to any alleged search. (Transcript at 32-34) . 
8 
West Valley City v. Randy Burton at 8 (other citations omitted). 
Recapitulating the relevant facts, the officer had observed 
Burton's driving pattern, (Transcript at 26) had detected the odor 
of alcohol from outside Burton's vehicle, (Id. at 32-33) and Burton 
had volunteered that he was drunk, (Videotape; see also Transcript 
at 15) all prior to inserting his head into Burton's vehicle. At 
that point the officer had probable cause that Burton had committed 
an offense. The officer was therefore duty-bound to investigate 
the extent of Burton's intoxication, to ensure the public's safety. 
The officer explained that he quickly confirmed Burton's 
drunken state by sniffing the air near Burton. {Id. at 12). This 
confirmation required that the officer place his head near Burton, 
which required a slight insertion into the open window of the 
vehicle.4 This insertion is justified under Lopez because it 
quickly confirmed that Burton was drunk, without requiring any 
effort on Burton's part. The intrusion was minimal, and Burton was 
not required to perform any act. In addition, the officer gained 
no more "evidence" via the intrusion than he already had prior to 
the alleged "illegal search." Burton had admitted he was drunk, 
{Id. at 15; videotape), and the officer had detected the odor of 
alcohol prior to inserting his head. (Id. at 33-34) . The officer 
4
 In addition, the officer stated that he had difficulty 
hearing Burton, and so placed his head near the window. 
(Transcript at 21). Listening to Burton's statements is part of 
the investigation. 
9 
obtained no additional evidence because of his alleged "search." 
Burton relies heavily on the fact that the officer could not 
remember asking if Burton had been drinking. (Burton's Brief at 
12) . The transcript does not reveal the explanation, but the 
videotape does.5 The officer did not need to ask if Burton had 
been drinking, because Burton volunteered the information himself. 
Burton's statement, which came prior to and independent of any 
alleged "search," also justified further investigation, including 
field sobriety tests. 
Burton mistakenly cites State v. Schlosser, 774 P. 2d 1132 
(Utah 1989), to support his contention that any warrantless search 
of a vehicle is illegal. However, Schlosser clearly states that a 
warrantless search of a vehicle is justified "if there is probable 
cause for the search . . . ." Schlosser, 774 P. 2d at 1135; see 
also United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982). Contrary to 
Burton's argument, Schlosser does not prohibit all warrantless 
vehicle searches, it requires probable cause before a vehicle may 
be searched. 
In this case, the officer had probable cause that Burton was 
drunk. In order to quickly and efficiently confirm this, the 
officer merely placed his head closer to Burton and sniffed the 
5
 Burton insists that this Court "ignore . . . the references 
. . ." to the admissions made on the videotape. (Burton's Brief at 
13 n. 9). However, the videotape was introduced as evidence, and 
is thus part of the record. (Transcript at 17-18). Furthermore, 
the officer testified that Burton volunteered that he had been 
drinking. {Id. at 15). Since Burton's admission is clearly 
established in the record, the Court is obligated to consider it. 
10 
air. This quickly confirmed the extent of Burton's intoxication. 
The search was justified under Lopez and Schlosser.6 
To conclude, the trial judge's ruling to suppress the field 
sobriety tests was not supported by the evidence. The officer 
detected the odor of alcohol prior to inserting his head and 
allegedly "searching" Burton's vehicle. (Transcript at 33-34). 
Furthermore, Burton admitted that he was drunk. {Id. at 15, 
Videotape). The officer had probable cause before any alleged 
"search," and was justified in conducting an investigation to 
quickly confirm that Burton was drunk. Sniffing the air near 
Burton quickly confirmed that Burton was very intoxicated and posed 
a threat to other drivers. No new evidence was obtained from the 
alleged "search," and Burton was not inconvenienced. Thus, the 
officer's action was appropriate under Lopez. Finally, Burton 
completely misapplies Schlosser. The officer had probable cause, 
so the "search," being limited to confirmation of alcohol on 
Burton's breath, was appropriate and justified. 
III. EVEN IF THE SEARCH IS IMPROPER, THE FIELD SOBRIETY 
TESTS ARE ADMISSIBLE, BECAUSE THERE IS AN 
INDEPENDENT SOURCE FOR THAT EVIDENCE. 
Even if the alleged "search" was improper, the field sobriety 
tests are still admissible, because there is an independent source 
for them. As stated in Appellant's Brief, "evidence which would be 
6
 As is argued below, the "search" yielded no new evidence. 
The officer had already detected the odor of alcohol from outside 
the vehicle prior to the "search." 
11 
subject to the exclusionary rule may be admissible if the police 
had an 'independent source' for discovery of the evidence." 
(Appellant's Brief at 10; see also State v. Northrup, 756 P. 2d 
1288, 1293 (Utah App. 1988) . The field sobriety tests are 
admissible despite the alleged "improper search," because the 
officer had developed a reasonable articulable suspicion prior to 
the alleged "search." 
As has been discussed, the judge specifically held that the 
officer detected the odor of alcohol prior to inserting his head 
into the vehicle. (Transcript at 32-34) . In addition, the 
videotape shows, and the officer's testimony confirms that Burton 
admitted he was drunk. {Id. at 15, Videotape). All of this 
evidence was obtained prior to the alleged "search." This evidence, 
as has been stated, gave the officer probable cause to conduct the 
field sobriety tests. 
To conclude, even if the "search" is removed from the picture 
altogether, the officer still had ample evidence to require Burton 
to perform field sobriety tests, and the judge's ruling was 
improper. Suppression of evidence should not put the government in 
a worse position if the police would have obtained the evidence if 
no misconduct had taken place. The facts show that field sobriety 
tests were justified, even if the "search" was improper. 
IV. THE FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS ARE ADMISSIBLE 
BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT OBTAINED AS A RESULT OF 
THE "SEARCH." 
Even if the "search" is improper, the field sobriety tests are 
12 
admissible because they were not obtained as a result of the 
"search." The exclusionary rule only suppresses "evidence obtained 
by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution." Mapp 
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); see also State v. Shoulderblade, 
905 P.2d 289, 292 (Utah 1995). Thus, if the "search" was improper, 
only the evidence that was obtained as a result of that search 
should be excluded. 
No evidence should be excluded, because no new evidence was 
obtained that led to the field sobriety tests. The alleged "search" 
only confirmed that Burton had the odor of alcohol on his breath, 
which the officer had already detected prior to the "search." 
(Transcript at 32-34). Therefore, even if the "search" was 
improper, it had no effect on the admissibility of the field 
sobriety tests, because no new evidence was obtained that led to 
those tests. 
Appellant weakly contends that the record does not support the 
"independent source" for the field sobriety tests.7 However, the 
judge's rulings and the videotape establish that the officer had 
probable cause to request the field sobriety tests despite any 
"search." Since the "search" yielded no evidence, and since the 
field sobriety tests are admissible even if the "search" had never 
7
 Burton also argues that the sobriety tests are not 
"attenuated" from the alleged "search." "It is apparent from the 
record that the odor . . . stemmed from the illegal search . . . ." 
(Burton's Brief at 20 and 20). This is wrong. What is apparent 
from the record is that the officer detected the odor of alcohol 
prior to any alleged "search," (Transcript at 32-34), and that 
Burton voluntarily admitted he was drunk. {Id. at 15, Videotape.) 
13 
occurred, the trial judge's ruling must be reversed, and the field 
sobriety tests must be admitted. 
CONCLUSION 
Suppression of evidence should not place the government in a 
worse position if the evidence would have been obtained in the 
absence of any improper conduct. That summarizes Appellant's 
argument. Even if the "search" was improper, the record shows that 
the field sobriety tests were justified without the "search." In 
the alternative, appellant argues that the "search" was not an 
improper intrusion, but was justified under State v. Lopez. Either 
way, the trial judge's ruling was wrong, and it should be reversed. 
The record of the hearing to suppress is complete and 
available for this Court's review. The transcript contains all of 
the proceedings, all documents are available for review, and the 
videotape of Burton's arrest for drunken driving, (which was 
introduced as evidence at the hearing) is also available for the 
Court. Burton now expects a ruling in his favor because the trial 
judge failed to make findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
However, the record is complete enough to review. Even if those 
findings were deemed necessary, the proper remedy is remand to 
obtain them. Appellant has no objection to remand, because it 
agrees that findings of fact based on the proceedings of the trial 
court would be beneficial. 
The alleged "search" was actually part of the officer's proper 
investigation of a potential crime. Despite Burton's contention to 
14 
the contrary, the trial judge held that the officer detected the 
odor of alcohol prior to any alleged search. Furthermore, the 
videotape and the officer's testimony reveal that Burton admitted 
he was drunk. As the trial judge held, this information gave the 
officer a reasonable articulable suspicion that Burton had 
committed a crime, and thus the scope of his investigation 
expanded. (Transcript at 32-34; see also State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 
1127 (Utah 1994)). 
The permissible scope of the officer's investigation allowed 
him to diligently pursue a means of investigation that would 
quickly confirm or dispel the suspicion of criminal activity. The 
officer testified that he confirmed not the presence of alcohol on 
Burton's breath, but the extent of his intoxication. (As has been 
stated, the officer detected the odor of alcohol prior to the 
alleged "search.") The officer confirmed the degree of Burton's 
impairment by placing his head closer to Burton, so he could sniff 
the air. This quickly and efficiently confirmed the extent of 
Burton's intoxication only, as the odor of alcohol had already been 
detected. In addition, the officer testified that he had trouble 
hearing Burton, so he placed his head closer in order to 
communicate better. Listening to the statements of a defendant is 
part of an officer's investigation. Finally, Burton was not 
inconvenienced by the alleged "search," because it quickly and 
efficiently confirmed the extent of his intoxication. Which is 
more rapid and convenient: Sniffing the air briefly or performing 
field sobriety tests? The officer's actions were thus acceptable 
15 
and justified, and the trial judge should be reversed. 
In the alternative, even if the "search" was improper, the 
field sobriety tests are admissible based on the evidence obtained 
independent of the "search." Independently-obtained evidence is 
admissible despite improper conduct. State v. Northrup, 756 P.2d 
1288 (Utah App. 1988). The trial court specifically held that the 
officer detected the odor of alcohol prior to any alleged "search." 
This gave the officer a reasonable articulable suspicion that 
Burton was drunk, and justified field sobriety tests. Furthermore, 
the record and the videotape show that Burton voluntarily admitted 
he was drunk, which also justified the field sobriety tests. Even 
if the alleged improper conduct had never taken place, the field 
sobriety tests would be admissible. 
In a related vein, the "search" produced no new evidence, and 
did not result in the field sobriety tests. The exclusionary rule 
only requires the suppression of evidence obtained as a result of 
improper conduct. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); State v. 
Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d 289, 292 (Utah 1995). The facts of this 
case show that the alleged "search" did not yield any evidence 
leading, to the field sobriety tests. The officer detected the odor 
of alcohol prior to the alleged "search," and Burton voluntarily 
admitted he was drunk. At most, the "search" merely confirmed the 
extent of Burton's intoxication, but did not yield new evidence 
that led to the field sobriety tests. Since no evidence was 
obtained, none can be suppressed. The trial judge's ruling must 
therefore be reversed. 
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To conclude, the trial judge's decision to suppress the field 
sobriety tests was wrong. The tests are admissible based on 
evidence obtained independently of any impropriety. The alleged 
"search" was proper under as a reasonable investigation of criminal 
activity, based on the officer's reasonable articulable suspicion 
obtained prior to any "search." Either way, the field sobriety 
tests are admissible, and the trial judge's decision to suppress 
them must be reversed. 
For these reasons, Appellant respectfully requests that this 
Court reverse the order of the Third Circuit Court suppressing 
evidence in this case. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 16th day of January, 1997. 
ELLIOT R/LAWRENCE 
Assistant City Attorney 
Attorney for Appellant 
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